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FOLARIN AKINBAMI argues that government rescues 
of banks should be avoided to mitigate financial risk
 
 A BRIEF EXPLANATION 
 OF INSURANCE
 
INSURANCE is a method of risk mitigation whereby 
individual people, corporations and other organisations 
facing a particular type of risk take action to protect 
themselves from the potential losses if that risk materialises. 
It therefore differs from risk mitigation or risk management 
techniques that try to prevent risk.
Rather than try to prevent the risk altogether, insurance 
looks to protect the insured i.e. to compensate them for 
potential losses arising if the risk should happen. It is an ex 
ante (before the event) way to tackle the risk of a damaging 
event. It accepts the fact that risks cannot always be 
prevented and that they can occur.
With most types of insurance today, a number of people 
come together to collectively share the cost of protecting 
themselves from the potential losses they may individually 
suffer if the risk arises for them individually. This can either 
be done privately, for example fire insurance, buildings and 
contents insurance, or through a public, social insurance 
scheme, whereby the pool of insurance funds are collected 
and administered by a public authority, or some other social 
insurance fund (for example social security or publicly-
funded health insurance schemes such as the UK’s National 
Health Service). /// CONTINUED
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY is still recovering from the 
devastating global financial crisis of 2007-2009. The global 
financial crisis was caused, in large part, by excessive risk-
taking by banks and other financial institutions, and by the 
eventual bursting of asset price bubbles in housing markets 
in many western countries such as the UK and the US. The 
global financial crisis saw the near-collapse of several banks 
and the subsequent need for governments to use taxpayers’ 
funds to rescue such banks. 1 The financial rescue packages 
for the troubled banks are popularly referred to as ‘bank 
bailouts’. However, bank rescues need not be funded by the 
government, and sometimes they are funded by the banking 
industry itself. Examples include some of the bank rescues 
under the so-called ‘lifeboat’ during the secondary banking 
crisis of 1973-1975.2 On this occasion the magnitude of 
the financial problems faced by the troubled banks meant 
that their fellow banks were either unable or unwilling to 
come up with the funds necessary to rescue them. The costs 
of these bank rescues are substantial; for example the UK’s 
National Audit Office (NAO) reported in 2010 that the scale 
of financial support provided to the UK banks was £512 
billion.3 
The bank bailouts that resulted from the global financial 
crisis have been subjected to criticism on several fronts. 
For example, economists argue that bailouts encourage 
moral hazard, while social commentators (social justice 
advocates) have complained about the inequity of the 
bailouts, and argue that it resulted in an unfair transfer 
of wealth from the less affluent to the more affluent in 
society. Both sets of criticisms are, arguably, very strong. 
But another perspective is needed, in this case a ‘risk 
mitigation’ perspective. Risk mitigation refers to the ways of 
dealing with or managing risk, that is, the way in which risk 
is assessed, measured, prevented or managed.
The risk mitigation critique here is not a critique of the 
failures of the banks’ risk assessment models or their risk 
management techniques.1 Rather, it is a broader critique of 
how individuals and society as a whole approach risk, and 
the ways in which we deal with (mitigate) risk of damage 
when a banking crisis occurs. For this critique it is helpful 
to draw upon a well-known risk mitigation device that is 
prevalent in society today – insurance. Insurance is not 
necessarily the only risk mitigation technique one might 
compare with bailouts, but is useful for considering key 
features of a taxpayer-funded bank bailout. The objective 
is to compare the ways in which both insurance and bank 
bailouts are used to deal with the fallout from a bank failure 
and to highlight some of the more problematic features of 
bank bailouts.
 
Northern Rock was one of the first banks to be bailed out 
by UK government during the banking crisis.
1 For a critique on this see ‘Is meta-regulation all it’s cracked up to be? the case of UK 
financial regulation’. Journal of banking regulation. 14:16-32. http://dro.dur.ac.uk/10250/
2 R Cranston, Principles of Banking Law (Second edition), Oxford: Oxford University Press 
(2002) p. 95
3 National Audit Office (NAO), Monitoring the Financial Stability of UK Banks: Update on 
the Support Schemes, HM Treasury (2010) HC 676 Session 2010-2011, at pages 3 and 6. 
http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/1011/support_for_banks.aspx 
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Highlighting three key differences between insurance and 
bailouts helps us to see what problems bailouts have in 
terms of risk mitigation: 
1) EX ANTE PAYMENT OF PREMIUMS 
A key feature of insurance is that all the insured pay an 
insurance premium (a monetary contribution) to the pool of 
funds that is kept and used to protect them from risk. The 
funds are held by an insurance company (in the case of 
privately organised insurance) or by the State or one of its 
agencies (in the case of social or public insurance), which 
disburses funds to those who have paid their premiums and 
then subsequently suffered the misfortune of the insured 
risk occurring. Insurance premiums are paid ex ante to the 
insurance pool of funds. This is hugely beneficial because 
it means that each individual’s contribution (i.e. their 
insurance premium) is pre-determined and therefore each 
individual knows, from the outset, the full extent of their 
ultimate liability to the insurance fund. It is also advantageous 
because there is an attempt, when setting premiums, to 
calculate each individual’s insurance premium according to 
the risk that person poses to the insurance fund, for example 
people living in flood-prone areas might pay flood insurance 
premiums higher than for those in areas of low flood risk. This 
apportioning of premiums based on the risks posed by the 
individual represents a much fairer way of spreading the cost 
of disasters than most other risk protection strategies.
Bailouts, on the other hand, often occur without any prior or ex 
ante preparation for them. This is highly problematic because 
those who end up paying for the bailout (in the case of banks, 
the taxpayer) do not know in advance the full extent of their 
liability to the bailout fund. For example, governments in the 
UK and US have not really done a good job of explaining to 
taxpayers the full and final cost of the bank bailouts in those 
countries. In the US, the initial bank bailout proved to be 
inadequate and the government had to ask taxpayers for a 
further, larger bailout. It is also problematic because the costs 
of the bailout are not borne by those who posed the ultimate 
risk to the bailout fund. This failure to allocate costs based on 
the risks posed by the individual represents a very unfair way 
of spreading the cost of disasters.
2) INSURANCE IS OFTEN VOLUNTARY AND BASED ON PRIOR CONSENT 
Another important feature of private insurance is that it is 
usually voluntary and consensual, although some public 
insurance is mandatory (for example National Insurance 
contributions in the UK and social security contributions in the 
US). Even some privately organised insurance is mandatory, 
such as compulsory third-party insurance for motorists in the 
UK. The insured want the benefits of insurance conferred on 
them, and for this reason, consent to contributing to the pool 
of funds available to protect the less fortunate amongst them. 
Insurance is therefore in accordance with the rule of law and 
the principles of natural justice (duty to act fairly). It is also in 
accordance with most people’s preference for autonomy over 
themselves and their decisions. 
Taxpayer-funded bailouts, by contrast, are never voluntary 
or consensual as amply demonstrated by the hostility of a 
vast majority of citizens, in the UK, Ireland, Spain and US to 
the bank bailouts in those countries. Instead the decision to 
impose the bailout on taxpayers is carried out by governments 
who are faced with the threat made by the banking industry, 
that the consequences of not bailing out the troubled banks 
will be calamitous. Former US Treasury Secretary Henry 
Paulson appeared before US Congress warning US lawmakers 
that if they failed to approve his proposed bank bailout they 
would be responsible for precipitating the end of the world 
as we know it. Taxpayers are thus faced with a mandatory 
Protests around the world from the Occupy Movement were critical of governments bailing out banks during the financial crisis.
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payment to the banking industry even though the majority of 
taxpayers object, in principle, to making such payments and 
did not know before the banking crisis that they might have to 
meet these costs. It is unfair to make one group of people pay 
for the damage incurred by another group in this way. Some 
would even argue that this is immoral. 
3) THE TRANSFER OF FUNDS IS PROGRESSIVE, NOT REGRESSIVE 
A further important feature of insurance is that the 
materialisation of the risk results in a progressive transfer 
of resources from the more fortunate to the less fortunate. 
The transfer of funds helps the less fortunate to cope with 
the consequences of the risk occurring. Privately organised 
insurance indemnifies the victims of the disaster out of the 
pool of funds created from premiums paid by all those insured 
(including those who have not suffered from the disaster). 
With public or social insurance the less fortunate, such as 
the sick, elderly or unemployed, are paid out of the social 
insurance fund that all healthy, employed citizens have to 
contribute to. These examples represent a progressive and just 
way of collectively dealing with the occurrence of certain risks.
Taxpayer-funded bank bailouts do not, however, have this 
feature, and in fact the bank bailouts in the wake of the 
global financial crisis represented a regressive redistribution of 
resources, since taxpayers (many of whom are not necessarily 
wealthy or even ‘well-off’) had to bail out an industry regarded 
by many as comprised of well-paid, privileged constituents. 
Ironically, many of the bankers who took excessive risks were 
the employees that were being paid the largest amounts, 
and certainly, for bank employees, compensation often 
increased in line with their level of risk-taking. This represents 
a regressive and unfair approach to risk mitigation and it is 
bound to increase inequality in society, lead to problems of 
social cohesion and disrupt the very fabric of society. To this 
extent, taxpayer-funded bailouts can be regarded as very 
problematic for the financial system and civil justice.
 We need an alternative way to govern risk 
 in the banking industry.
The problems associated with taxpayer-funded bank 
bailouts are made clear by comparing such bailouts with the 
features of insurance. The comparison has shown that such 
bailouts are an inefficient and unfair way of dealing with the 
consequences of financial risk. They are inefficient because 
they represent an ineffective method of allocating liability for 
covering the costs associated with the occurrence of risk, and 
they are unfair because they represent a regressive, rather than 
a progressive, method of risk mitigation. To this extent, such 
bailouts should be avoided in the future and governments all 
over the world should search for ways to help taxpayers recoup 
the money expended on such bailouts, and ensure that the 
risk of bank failures is mitigated in the most efficient and fair 
manner possible.
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/// KEY MESSAGES FOR POLICY
-  Taxpayer-funded bank bailouts are not voluntary and 
the decision to impose them lies with governments 
faced with potentially devastating consequences for the 
financial system arising from bank failures.
-  Bank bailouts as a way to resolve financial crises should 
be avoided in future, because they unfairly transfer the 
cost of a disaster onto those who had little role in it.
-  The present system means that those who must bear the 
costs for the bailouts (i.e. the taxpayers), are unaware in 
advance of the full extent of their potential liability.
-  In the aftermath of a taxpayer-funded bank bailout it is 
important that governments find ways of recouping the 
public funds spent on the bailout.
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